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A regulatory structure designed to encourage small business formation and rapid growth 
is essential to economic prosperity.  It has been said, “[a] healthy economy is a dynamic 
organism that is constantly in a state of change and renewal.”1  This process has been described 
as “Creative Destruction,”2 in which competition and innovation serve as catalysts, “‘incessantly 
destroying the old [economy], incessantly creating a new one’”3 This process depends upon 
mechanisms through which competition and innovation can serve as catalysts, the more efficient 
the mechanism, the more likely the process will result in a healthy economy.  Entrepreneurial 
start-up ventures are one such mechanism. 4    
The efficiency of these ventures depends upon a number of factors, the primary factor 
being the ease with which “patient,” high risk capital can be acquired.5  Unfortunately, start-up 
ventures face significant obstacles in their quest for capital, which ultimately decrease their 
efficiency.6  This is particularly troubling given their increasing economic significance.7  “Small 
businesses have always been the backbone of our economy. . . . [they] have sustained the 
                                                 
1 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPTER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 (3d ed., 1950). 
2 SCHUMPTER, supra note 1. 
3 See John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A Proposal to Expand the 
Intermediary Role of Finders in The Private Capital Raising Setting, 37 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 861 (2005). 
4 See id. 
5 Freear, et al., Creating New Capital Markets For Emerging Ventures, (stating “for entrepreneurs, raising, 
patient, high risk equity financing is the critical capital formation challenge”); see also Jeffrey E. Sohl, The U.S. 
Angel and Venture Capital Markets: Recent Trends and Developments, J. Private Equity (stating untold numbers of 
emerging companies fail because of their inability to raise sufficient capital “to move promising technology from the 
laboratory to the marketplace”).  “Patient” high risk capital refers to capital invested in the “seed” or “early stage” 
rounds of financing in which the investor has a longer exit horizon, typically five to seven years.  Id.  
6 Sohl, supra note 5. Sohl states: 
Highgrowth Ventures need patient, value added equity capital to fuel growth.  Under efficient 
market conditions capital flows from the suppliers of the capital, angels and venture capital funds, 
unimpeded to the demand side, the [] entrepreneurs.  In the United States, the private equity 
market does not meet this standard of efficiency, not by a long shot. 
Id. 
7 Jeffrey E. Sohl, The Early Stage Equity Market in the United States, available at.  Sohl states that “as recently as 
1979, the U.S. began a transition from a declining industrial and manufacturing economy to an emerging 
entrepreneurial/innovation-driven economy.”  Id.  This trend, according to Sohl, continues to accelerate.  Id. 
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economy in weaker times . . . and put us back on the track to long term growth.”8  According to 
the U.S. Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy, small businesses represent more 
than 99% of all employers, employ half of the private sector employees, create more than 50% of 
non-farm private gross domestic product, and generate 60% to 80% of net new jobs annually.9  
These numbers are somewhat misleading, as they represent the impact that small businesses as 
an entire class have on the economy and fail to give credit where credit is due.  The bulk of job 
and new wealth creation is attributable to a small segment of the small business community, 
namely entrepreneurial ventures that start small but are designed to grow fast.10   
It is estimated that the financial needs of emerging ventures for patient, high risk capital 
is approximately 60 billion dollars annually or about fifteen times the annual investment of the 
institutional venture capital pool.11  This phenomena, called the “funding gap,” can be attributed 
to the lack of an “efficient” market.12  An efficient market is characterized by informed buyers 
and sellers and low transaction costs.13  Early-stage equity financing, however, occurs in a 
market where access to information is extremely limited and transaction costs are prohibitively 
                                                 
8 The State of Small Business: A Report of the President 1 (2001) [hereinafter Small Business Report]; see also 
The State of Small Business: A Report of the President 1 (1997); (“[Small Businesses] are the foundation of the 
Nation’s economic growth:  virtually all jobs, 53 percent of employment, 51 percent of private sector output, and 
disproportionate share of innovations come from small firms”). 
9 U.S. Small Business Administration, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://app1.sba.gov/faqs/faq 
IndexAll.cfm?areaid=24. 
10  Sohl, supra note 7.  There are three types of small businesses, the living dead, middle market ventures, and 
high potential ventures.  The “living dead,” represent income businesses created to provide employment and fulfill 
owner lifestyle needs.  These companies represent 90% of small businesses and are characterized by five year 
revenue projections under 10 million and the lack of any clear exit strategy.  Id.  Middle market ventures are 
characterized by 5 year revenue projections of 10 to 50 million, and may, if properly structured, offer capital gains 
and cash out opportunities for investors.  High potential ventures have 5 year revenue projections in excess of 50 
million, and represent potential jackpots for investors and entrepreneurs.  These high potential ventures represent 1 
percent of the small business class, and are designed to be publicly traded or acquired within 5 years.  Id. 
11 Id.   
12 Frear, supra note 5. see also  Sohl, supra note 5. 
13 See Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified: The Lacunae in Contemporary 
Securities Markets, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291 (1994) (stating well developed markets . . . absorb[] information 
instantaneously, so that prevailing prices of securities reflect[] the value that an informed investor would rationally 
be willing to pay. . .”). 
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excessive.14  In fact, innumerable small ventures fail because they cannot raise the necessary 
capital to get their “promising ideas from the laboratory to the market place”,15 costing the 
“United States untold thousands of jobs and innovations, and billions of dollars of tax 
revenue.”16   
Considering the need for well-informed market participants, it would seem that any 
regulatory structure should be designed to produce an environment conducive to the free flow of 
relevant reliable information.  The current regulatory structure, however, contains numerous 
rules that restrict both issuers’ and investors’ ability to provide and obtain relevant information.  
This contributes to the continued expansion of the “funding gap,” which ultimately decreases the 
portion of capital available for ventures in the seed and early stage of financing.17   
Few vehicles exist for bringing together potential investors and ventures seeking 
capital.  Transaction costs are high for the entrepreneur, raising private equity 
capital involves a costly time consuming personal networking process, and for the 
investor, with considerable time and dollars spent searching and evaluating 
investment opportunites.  The majority of active private sector investors report 
that they have additional capital available to invest but limited quality deal flow is 
the primary constraint.18 
 
The early stage equity market is composed of two categories of investors, who can be 
distinguished by, among other things, the stage at which they enter the capital “life” of a 
venture.19  The first category is comprised of institutional investors, such as venture capital 
funds.  These investors typically do not involve themselves in the seed or early stage rounds of 
                                                 
14 Freear, supra note 5. (attributing market inefficiencies to a lack of directories of private investors, public 
records of investment transactions, and vehicles for matching investors and entrepreneurs). 
15 Sohl, supra note 7.  
16  William K. Sjostrom, Relaxing the Ban: It’s Time to Allow General Solicitation and Advertising in Exempt 
Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2004); See Freear, supra note 5; General Accounting Office, Report of the 
Chairman, Comm, on Small Bus., U.S. Senate, Small Business Efforts to Facilitate Equity Capital Formation 1, 3-4 
(2000) (“In general, . . . equity capital is widely viewed as less accessible and more costly per dollar raised for small 
businesses compared with large businesses”). 
17 Sohl, supra note 5.    
18 Sohl supra note 5.  
19 Sohl supra note 5.  
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financing.  The remaining category is composed of individual investors, known as “Angels.”  
Angel investors are high net worth individual investors and have historically invested in the seed 
and early stage rounds of financing.20  When viewed individually, Angels may not “merit a blip 
on any chart of total investment capital in this country;” however, taken as a whole, Angels 
“have quickly become the nations major source of start-up capital” whose investments “serve as 
spawning grounds for their venture capitalist counterparts.” 21  
The solution to the inefficiencies in the private equity market lies in finding the 
appropriate balance between the informational needs of small issuers and private investors and 
the government’s interest in investor protection.  These two, often times conflicting interests, 
have unfortunately led to the development of a body of law replete with internal inconsistencies. 
In an attempt to facilitate a balance, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 193322 (the 
“Securities Act”) creating a system of registration and administrative review designed to 
eliminate fraud and other abuses stemming from the lack of a regulated securities market.23  
Congress believed the registration system would eliminate securities fraud by assuring adequate 
                                                 
20 Angels continue to be the largest source of seed and start-up capital, with 55 percent of 2005 angel 
investments in the seed and start-up stage. This preference for seed and start-up investing is followed closely by 
post-seed/start-up investments of 43 percent. The increase in post-seed/start-up investing continues a trend that 
began in 2004 and represents a 10 percent increase in historical levels. UNH Center For Venture Research: 2005, 
Angel Market Exhibits Modest Growth Health Care/Medical Sector Is Hot; Women Entrepreneurs Cashing In On 
Capital, at http://www.unh.edu/ news/news_releases /2006/ march/lw_060327angel.html 
While angels are not abandoning seed and start-up investing, it appears that market conditions, and 
the preferences of large formal angel alliances, are resulting in angels engaging in more later-stage 
investments. . . . This shift in investment strategies toward post seed investments reduces the 
proportional amount of seed and start-up capital. This restructuring of the angel market has in turn 
resulted in fewer dollars available for seed investments, thus exacerbating the capital gap for seed 
and start-up capital in the United States. 
Id. 
21 Sohl, supra note 7.  
22 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000). 
23 See Stuart R. Cohn, Securities Markets For Small Issuers: The Barrier of Federal Solicitation and 
Advertising Prohibitions, 38 U. Fla. L. Rev. 1 (1986); H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933); but see Macy 
& Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 Texas L. Rev. 347, 350 (1991) (stating that “although fraudulent 
securities [activities] undoubtedly occurred . . . the standard account that securities fraud was rampant before the 
advent of [securities] regulation is not proven”). 
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disclosure of material information.24   Requiring disclosure was also intended to provide 
investors and issuers the information necessary to make informed investment or other relevant 
decisions and increase the efficiency of the securities market.25  Congress, however, did not 
intend to impose the registration process on every single offering of securities; Congress 
understood that in certain circumstances  “companies and transactions are of insufficient 
magnitude to warrant full federal regulation or any regulation at all.”26  As such, Congress 
designed the private offering exemption27 and authorized the SEC to create additional 
exemptions “where there is no practical need for its application or where the public benefits are 
too remote.”28 
Unfortunately, the SEC, and to a lesser extent the courts, have imposed conditions on 
availability of registration exemptions that fail to serve any practical need or produce any 
significant public benefit.29  Of those prerequisites, the prohibition on general solicitation30 and 
                                                 
24 Jeffrey T. Haughey & Kevin M. Velar, Empirical Research Project, Blue Sky Laws and State Takeover 
Statutes: New Importance for an Old Battleground, 7 J. CORP. LAW 689 (1982) (stating “[f]ederal securities laws 
[traditionally] have been drafted with the aim of providing investors with accurate and complete information on 
which to base their investment decisions”).   Congress declined to adopt the merit approach, irrespective of the value 
or fairness of a transaction or other corporate action, after adequate disclosure, the investor ultimately determines the 
merits of the investment.  Id. The SEC does not have any authority to prevent an offering from going forward 
because it considers the investment overly risky.  MARK I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 1 (4th ed., 2004); 
but see L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLES MONEY 92 (1914) (stating “[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy for 
social and industrial diseases.  Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”); R. STEVENSON, CORPORATIONS AND 
INFORMATION – SECRECY, ACCESS, & DISCLOSURE 81-82 (stating “[t]oday the disclosure requirements of the 
securities laws are used, in a variety of ways, for the purpose of influencing a wide range of corporate primary 
behavior”). 
25  See Haughey & Velar, supra note 24. 
26 Exposure Draft of Final Report of Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies, Securities Act Release 
No. 8666, [hereinafter Advisory Report] 2006 WL 520112 (February 28, 2006). 
27 Section 4(2) of the Securities Act exempts from registration “transactions by an issuer not involving any 
public offering.”  15 U.S.C. § 7d(2) (2000). 
28 See H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1993). 
29 See Cohn, supra note 23; see also Joel Seligman, Götterdämmerung for the Securities Act?, 75 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 887 (1997) (suggesting an ideological shift has occurred from early concerns of fraud to the current concern the 
“the cost of registration . . . no longer can be justified.”) 
30 The term “general solicitation” denotes the use of “mass media or other similar marketing techniques to effect 
a widespread offering of securities to the public.”   Patrick Daugherty, Rethinking the Ban on General Solicitation, 
38 EMORY L. J. 67 (1989)   
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advertising serves as the most significant barrier for small companies seeking capital.31 The 
prohibition applies to both the statutory private offering exemption under section 4(2) of the 
Securities Act, and to all offerings, with the exception of Rule 504,32 falling under the “safe 
harbors” of Regulation D.33 Therefore, to benefit from the relief provided by the Regulation D 
“safe harbors” small companies, in offerings of any real size, must refrain from engaging in 
advertising or any other activities that could be deemed general solicitations. 
This article argues conditioning the availability of exemptions from registration on what 
amounts to an unnecessary restriction on the free flow of information not only undermines the 
purpose of the private offering exemption, but forecloses the possibility that an efficient market 
                                                 
31 Daugherty, supra note 30, at 68.    
32  Rule 504 permits general solicitation in certain exempt offerings not exceeding 1,000,000 in the following 
circumstances  
(i) Exclusively in one or more states that provide for the registration of the securities, and require the public 
filing and delivery to investors of a substantive disclosure document before sale, and are made in 
accordance with those state provisions; 
(ii) In one or more states that have no provision for the registration of the securities or the public filing or 
delivery of a disclosure document before  
sale, if the securities have been registered in at least one state that provides for such registration, public 
filing and delivery before sale, offers and sales are made in that state in accordance with such provisions, 
and the disclosure document is delivered before sale to all purchasers (including those in the states that 
have no such procedure); or 
(iii) Exclusively according to state law exemptions from registration that permit general solicitation and 
general advertising so long as sales are made only to "accredited investors" as defined in § 230.501(a). 
17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1) (2000). 
Rule 504 was intended to provide an exemption for “seed capital” offerings; however, the limited dollar 
amount and the lack of preemption of state regulation resulted in an exemption almost completely devoid 
of practical utility.  See, Daugherty, supra note 30, at 69. Rule 504 fails to address the practical realities 
involved as a venture progresses through the various stages of financing.   In the early stages of financing 
“seed capital,” is usually supplied by the owner through “personal savings, credit card debt, and second 
home mortgages.”  Sjostrum, supra note 16, at 5.  The venture is not yet ripe for outside investors.  It is not 
until the company progresses past the “seed financing” stage where access to outside investors essential to 
their continued existence.  Once the company has progressed past the stage of seed financing rule 504, 
because of its 1 million dollar ceiling is of no practical significance.  see also Cohn, supra note 23, at 13. 
The relief accorded by this provision is of little practical value, as most issuers that seek 
exemption from federal registration similarly seek to avoid state registration, since the later also 
entails filing and review of a disclosure document, additional costs, delays and, in some instances, 
uncertainties related to ‘merit review’ standards of state law.  
Cohn, supra note 39, at 13 n.55.      
33 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (2000). See rule 502(c), id. § 230.502(c), discussed in detail infra notes 102-14 
and accompanying text. Rules 504 and 505 of Regulation D, id. §§ 230.504-.505, were adopted under § 3(b) of the 
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2000). See Revisions of Certain Exemptions From Registration for Transactions 
Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, at 11,267 (Mar. 16, 
1982). Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2000), was adopted under § 4(2). See id. at 11,267. 
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for the securities of small issuers will develop. 34  As such, an exemption that provides small 
issuers with well defined and objective “issuer friendly” criteria is needed35, to assure not only 
small issuers, but the small offering industry as a whole, that the exemption will not be lost 
because of a mere technical oversight. 36   The current system fails to meet this standard, in large 
part, because the presence of a general solicitation or advertising in connection with a single 
offer or sale of securities results in the loss of an exemption from registration requirements. 37 
The ease with which an individual can access or distribute information has completely 
altered small offering landscape.38  Advancements in communications technology have 
introduced new variables into the cost/benefit equation, such that any benefits a general 
solicitation and advertising prohibition may have produced are no longer sufficient to justify the 
costs imposed on small issuers considering the economic significance of entrepreneurial start-up 
                                                 
34  See Sargent, The Federal Securities Law and Small Business, 33 BUS. LAW. 901, 916 (1978). One former SEC 
Commissioner has stated:  
[T]he attitude of the Commission and its over-zealous regulation is, in part, responsible for killing 
the capital market for small, innovative, start-up companies. How can a new venture capital 
company file a registration statement for an equity security today? The costs are prohibitively high 
and the chances for a successful offering are almost nil.  
Id.; see Malkiel, The Capital Formation Problem in the United States, 34 J. FIN. 291 (1979). 
35 The lack of objective requirements has plagued the private offering exemption for decades, as one SEC 
Chairman put it, the “private offering exemption had become an almost impassable, not to say impossible, legal 
jungle.” Casey, supra note 1, at 583. 
36   A finding that an offering failed to comply with the provisions of a statutory or regulatory exemption results 
in a violation of the registration statement and prospectus requirements of § 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) 
(2000). Section 12(1) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77l (2000), provides civil remedies of rescission or damages for 
purchasers of stock sold in violation of § 5, and no good faith or other mitigating defenses are available to an issuer 
in violation. Civil liability under § 12(1) may be imposed against participants, including broker-dealers, instrumental 
in the sales process. Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l 
Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971) . 
37   Concerns that an exemption could be lost due to a finding that a general solicitation has occurred are 
certainly justified.  As one scholar has pointed out: 
The lack of experience and knowledge about securities laws remains today among many lawyers 
and is reminiscent of Professor David Ratner’s hilarious (and perhaps apocryphal) Letters From A 
Kentucky Lawyer . . . A Kentucky lawyer writes to the SEC (in response to an SEC inquiry) that 
‘[t]here are a dozen lawyers in this town, and I would not give two cents for what all of us put 
together know about Federal laws.... If some poor fellow comes in with a Federal problem, I tell 
him to write his Congressman.’  
Stuart R. Cohn, The Impact of Securities Laws on Developing Companies: Would the Wright Brothers Have Gotten 
Off the Ground? 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 315 (1999) (citing  Letters from a Kentucky Lawyer, in DAVID L. 
RATNER & THOMAS L. HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 342-44 (5th ed. 1996)) 
38 See e.g., Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purpose SEC Release No. 33-7233 (Oct. 6, 1995). 
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comapnies.39  Stated another way, the public/private distinction, inasmuch as it depends upon the 
absence of a general solicitation or advertising, no longer serves to adequately differentiate 
between those investors who deserve the protections of the Securities Act and those who do 
not.40   
Part I briefly outlines the registration process and disclosure requirements to show that in 
addition to the excessive financial burdens registration imposes on small companies, there are 
other legitimate reasons why a small company may wish to avoid a “public offering.”   
Part II examines the legislative history, administrative pronouncements, and case law 
interpreting the private offering exemption leading up to Regulation D.  This section illustrates 
that the prohibition on general solicitation is an administrative and, to a lesser extent, judicial 
perquisite lacking any statutory or practical justification.   
Part III discusses the anti-solicitation doctrine as embodied in Rule 502(c), of Regulation 
D.  This section argues that, as applied, the prohibitions on general solicitation and advertising 
inhibit capital formation and are neither necessary nor sufficient to maintain investor protection. 
Part IV offers a simple solution that appropriately balances the needs of small issuers in 
acquiring patient capital with the government’s interest in protecting investors.  This section 
argues that the problems associated with the prohibition on general solicitation and advertising 
can be alleviated by an administrative rule adopting an exemption from the registration for Small 
                                                 
39 Concerns regarding the excessive burdens the current exemptive scheme places on small businesses have 
existed for decades.  See Manning Gilbert Warren III, A Review of Regulation D: The Present Exemption Regimen 
For Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 Am. U. L. Rev. 355, 356 (1984).  The SEC conducted a 
study to determine the effect of securities regulations on small businesses, which revealed concerns that the 
registration requirements of the Securities Act disproportionately restrained small businesses trying to raise capital 
throught the sale of securities.  See id. 
40 The Supreme Court in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co, interpreted the requirements of the private offering 
exemption and made clear that in determining whether a particular offering is within the purview of exemption the 
primary concern is whether the offerees need the protection of the federal securities laws.  346 U.S. 119 (1953); see 
Friedman, supra note 13, at 306 (stating that the prohibition on general solicitation and advertising has “operated to 
encourage the concentration of risky securities sold in private offerings in the portfolios of limited numbers of 
investors”). 
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Private Issuers (“SPI’s”)41 that would permit general solicitation and advertising in connection 
with the offer or sale of securities.  
 
I. AVOIDING REGISTRATION AT ANY COST 
 
  Section 5 of the Securities Act makes it illegal for anyone to use any means of interstate 
commerce or of the mails to sell or offer to sell a security in the United States unless the offer 
and sale are registered or exempt from registration. 42  Under the Securities Act, an offer includes 
“every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a 
security, for value,”43 and has been given a much broader interpretation than “offer” under the 
common law of contracts.44  For example, while advertisements are not considered common law 
offers “an advertisement by a company seeking investors in its securities would clearly constitute 
an offer for purposes of the Securities Act.”45  This places a heavy burden on small issuers who 
may not have pre-existing relationships with investors willing to provide the necessary capital.46  
                                                 
41 This article suggests that SPI’s should be defined as a company that meets all of the following criteria: 
(i) Is not a Reporting Company, e.g., one that is obligated to file periodic reports with the SEC under section 
15(d) or 13(a) of the Exchange Act.  
(ii) Has annual revenues of less than $20,000,000; 
(iii) Is a U.S. issuer; and  
(iv) Is not an investment company and is not an asset-backed issuer (as defined in § 229.1101 of chapter 17 
U.S.C.). 
The revenue limitation was set at less that 20 million to address the needs of (1) start up companies in their research 
and initial commercialization stage, (2) middle market companies; and (3) high potential companies.  These 
companies, as previously discussed, are the traditional private equity market participants considered to be most 
severely impacted by federal and state securities regulations.  See e.g., Sohl, supra note 7. 
42 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000). 
43 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2000). 
44 Under common law, an offer is defined as “the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made 
as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.” 1 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 comment a (2005) (emphasis added). 
45 Publication of Information Prior to or After Effective Date of Registration Statement, Securities Act of 1933 
Release No. 3844 (Oct. 8, 1957), 1957 SEC LEXIS 332, at 7. 
46 One factor in determining whether a general solicitation has taken place is the presence or absence of a pre-
existing relationship between the issuer and the offeree.  According to a number of SEC no action letters the 
relationship must provide the issuer with sufficient information to evaluate the offeree’s financial circumstances. See 
generally Mineral Lands Research & Marketing Corp., SEC No-Act WL 55694 (Dec. 4, 1985); Robert T. Willis, 
SEC No-Act. WL 233597 (Jan 18, 1988); Royce Exchange Fund Quest Advisory Corp., SEC No-Act. WL 490692 
(Aug. 28, 1996); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., SEC No-Act. 55679 (Dec. 3, 1985). 
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By reaching out to find potential investors the issuer will almost certainly engage in a prohibited 
solicitation and lose the benefit of the private placement exemption. 
 The question then becomes, so what?  Why doesn’t the issuer simply register with the 
SEC?  As previously discussed, the costs associated with registration are often prohibitive, 
however, there are other reasons why a small company may not wish to take the leap from 
private venture to “public company.”  This section discusses some of the costs, both financial 
and otherwise, associated with “going public,” and suggests that there are legitimate reasons, in 
addition to dollars and cents, that may foreclose the possibility of entering the public markets. 
A. Registration Just Costs Too Much 
 
To register an offer or sale under § 5, a registration statement must be filed with the SEC 
and a prospectus must be provided to the purchaser either at the time the security is delivered or 
confirmation of the sale is received, which ever comes first.  A registration statement is an 
extremely long document containing detailed and complex disclosures.  The costs associated 
with the preparation of a registration statement, “including accountant, attorney, investment 
banker, and printer fees, can easily run into the tens if not hundreds of thousands or dollars.”47  
The cost and nature of registration statements are a direct result of § 11 of the 1933 Act, which, 
in effect, imposes a due diligence requirement on various parties, such as the issuers, directors, 
and certain of its executive officers, the underwriters, and other experts.48   If a disgruntled 
purchaser institutes a suit under § 11 and it is shown that a material misstatement or omission 
was made in the registration statement, parties to the registration statement, except the issuer, can 
avoid liability only by establishing that they “had conducted a reasonable investigation and, after 
                                                 
47 Steinberg, supra note 24. 
48 Id. 
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such investigation, had no reason to believe and did not believe that the registration statement 
contained any materially false or misleading statements.49   
Even though the issuer is the only party that will be held strictly liable, the issuer may be 
insolvent and plaintiffs’ will undoubtedly look to the “deep pockets” party, usually the 
accountants or underwriters.50 The result is that “deep pockets” parties to a transaction, in an 
attempt to insulate themselves from liability, will require extensive, perhaps even excessive, due 
diligence and disclosure.51  For an SPI, particularly in the early stages of financing, these costs 
are typically prohibitive.52   
B. Airing Out Your Dirty Laundry  
 
The initial cost in preparing a registration statement is only one of the negative aspects of 
a public offering.  The registration statement, as discussed previously, requires extensive 
disclosure.  In “going public” the issuer will be required to hang its dirty linen out for public 
viewing.53  Once the venture consummates the public offering, certain provisions of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, such as § 12(g) or § 15(d), kick in imposing continuing 
disclosure requirements.  Under these disclosure rules the venture will be required to file annual, 
quarterly, and other periodic reports with the SEC as well as to provide periodic reports to its 
shareholders.54   
                                                 
49 Id.  Nonexperts, in regards to the expertized portion of the registration statement, need not conduct an 
investigation, and need only show that they had no reason to believe and did not believe that the expertized portions 
of the registration statement contained any materially false or misleading statement.  Experts are liable under § 11 
only for the portion of the registration statement which they “expertized.  Id.  
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 The SEC conducted a study to determine the effect of securities regulations on small businesses which 
revealed concerns that the registration requirements of the Securities Act disproportionately restrained small 
businesses trying to raise capital throught the sale of securities.  See Manning Gilbert Warren III, A Review of 
Regulation D: The Present Exemption Regimen For Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM. U. 
L. REV. 355, 356 (1984). 
53 See e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 384 (2d Cir. 1974). 
54 In its original form the Exchange Act , enacted to regulate post-distribution trading in securities, required 
companies to register only if their securities were traded on a national securities exchange, thereby assuring that 
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C. Sticking Your Neck Out 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2000, Section 404, charged the SEC with the responsibility of 
adopting rules requiring all reporting companies, other than registered investment companies, to 
include in their annual reports a statement of management’s responsibility for establishing and 
maintaining adequate internal control over the companies financial reporting, along with an 
evaluation of the efficiency of those internal controls.55  Adhering to these additional 
requirements will subject the venture to public scrutiny, increase operating expenses in the form 
of accountants and legal fees, and raise a continuous threat of litigation as a result of public 
disclosure.56   
Compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has, from the beginning, posed special 
problems for small public companies.57  Smaller companies, because of “limited resources, fewer 
internal personnel and less revenue with which to offset both implementation costs and the 
disproportionate fixed costs of section 404 compliance,” have been disproportionately subjected 
to the burdens associated with section 404 compliance.58    
D. No One Wants the Little Guy on Their Team 
 
In addition to the registration and disclosure requirements, registered public offerings 
require that the issuer obtain the assistance of an underwriter, which, as a practical matter, may 
                                                                                                                                                             
smaller companies of insufficient size to warrant exchange listing would not be subject to the overly burdensome 
federal securities regulation.   Advisory Report, supra note 26, at 14.   
55 Advisory Report, supra note 26, at 17. 
56 STEINBERG, supra note 24.  To make matters worse, the benefits associated with section 404 compliance, 
while obviously important to large public companies, are of less obvious value to smaller public companies.  The 
excessive burdens, taking into consideration the nominal value, results in a skewed cost/benefit analysis that “many 
believe, diminishes shareholder value, makes smaller public companies less attractive as investment opportunities 
and impedes their ability to compete.”  Advisory Report, supra note 21, at 18.. (finding these factors increasingly 
problematic given the crucial role small companies play in job creation and economic growth). 
57 Advisory Report, supra note 26, at 14.   
58 Id. 
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prove impossible for most small ventures.59 Generally, “no underwriter will take a company 
public unless the company has, at a minimum: (1) annual revenue of $20 million, (2) net income 
of $1 million, and (3) the potential to achieve and sustain significant growth rates (such as 
twenty percent or greater in revenues) for the next five to ten years.”60 Very few start-up 
ventures would qualify under this general rule, as such, they are required to proceed under an 
exemption from registration in order to conduct a successful offering.61 
E.  Not so Fast, the State Gets a Piece  
 
With certain exceptions, perfecting a federal exemption from registration does not 
insulate the issuer from the problems associated with the registration and disclosure requirements 
previously discussed.  
A dual system of federal-state securities regulation has existed since the adoption of the 
Securities Act.62  Unless an exemption from State registration requirements is available, an issuer 
                                                 
59 William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Going Public Through an Internet Direct Public Offering: A Sensible Alternative 
for Small Companies?, 53 FLA. L. REV. 529, 576-77 (2001). 
60 Sjostrum, supra note 15, at 4. (citing See Gen Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Comm. on Small 
Bus., U.S. Senate, Small Business Efforts to Facilitate Equity Capital Formation 1 (2000)).  “As noted, this is only a 
general rule and, as such, is an oversimplification. Exceptions to the rule include companies that have an innovative 
product in a hot market or that are, or are on track to be, first to market in a particular field.” Id. (citing see Laird H. 
Simons III, Considerations in Selecting the Managing Underwriter(s) for an Initial Public Offering, in HOW TO 
PREPARE AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 1999, at 37, 41 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Handbook Series No. B-1135, 
1999). 
61 See Sostrum, supra note 15, at 4. 
62 See Haughey, supra note 24.  Congress, by declining to preempt state regulation or limit it to disclosure 
provisions, created a dual regulatory system.  Id.  The first state blue sky law was passed in Kansas in 1911 for the 
purpose of “protecting the consumers from the robber barons.” State administrators “set out to save the public from 
imprudent investments.” See J. Mulvey, Blue Sky Law, 36 CANADIAN L. TIMES 37  (1916). 
The State of Kansas, most wonderfully prolific and rich in farming products, has a large 
population of agriculturists not versed in ordinary business methods. This State was the hunting 
ground of promoters of fraudulent enterprises; in fact their frauds became so barefaced that it was 
stated that they would sell building lots in the blue sky in fee simple. Metonymically they became 
known as blue sky merchants, and the legislation intended to prevent their frauds was called Blue 
Sky Law.  
Mulvey, supra at 37. 
These laws met with resistance from the securities industry.  That conflict came to a head in The Blue Sky Cases of 
1917.  See  Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 
(1917); and Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917).  The issue before the United States Supreme Court, 
in the Blue Sky Cases of 1917, was whether the states had the power to enact a comprehensive licensing system to 
protect their citizens from fraud.  See id.  The securities industry conceded the constitutionality of limited 
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must register any offer or sale of securities with each state in which the security is offered or 
sold.63  The entire regime has historically been characterized by securities industry discontent, 
resulting from a lack of regulatory uniformity, both between the state and federal exemptive 
schemes64 and among the different state securities laws. 65   
In recent years, both Congress and the SEC have recognized the need for greater 
uniformity in securities regulation; however, resulting legislative and administrative actions have 
failed to adequately address the problems of the dual system.66  In certain respects, state 
exemptive regimes have continued to be more protective of investor interests than their federal 
                                                                                                                                                             
registration, but opposed regulatory standards considered reaching far beyond the states legitimate interest in 
regulating fraud.  See id.  The Court held that the merit based comprehensive licensing statutes of Michigan, Ohio, 
and South Dakota statutes were constitutional.  See id. 
63 See STEINBERG, supra note 24, at 156; A thorough discussion of the state blue-sky regime is beyond the 
scope of this article, however, to fully satisfy the capital needs of the small ventures, federal-state uniformity is 
essential.  Critics disagree about the means in uniformity is to be achieved, some argue that coordinated efforts 
allowing the states to retain regulatory authority are needed while others suggest that Congress should flex its 
preemptive muscles and remove the barriers imposed by state securities laws. See, e.g., Manning Gilbert Warren III, 
Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case for Reallocation of Regulatory Responsibilities, 78 Wash. U. 
L.Q. 497 (2000).   
64 The North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) promulgated the Uniform Limited 
Offering Exemption (ULOE), that with qualifications exempts offerings sold in compliance with Rules 501-503 and 
505 of the Regulation D.  See STEINBERG, supra note 24, at 156.  Most states have adopted the ULOE in one form or 
another, however, ULOE does not address the problems associated with the anti-solicitation doctrine.  See id. 
65 Id.  Although the constitutionality of these state regulations has been determined, commentators continue to 
disagree as to whether “these rules create a fabric of efficient government control or a web of excessive 
entanglement.”  Haughey, supra note 24, at 697. 
Many view the small investor as unsophisticated and in need of protection from promoters of 
fraudulent and worthless schemes. Much more compelling in today’s political climate, however, 
may be the fear that government over regulation has interfered with the free market system to such 
an extent that the growth of business enterprise and the market economy has been inhibited. 
Haughey, supra note 24, at 692.  
66 Congress passed the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), Pub. L. No. 104-290, 
110 Stat. 3416 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2000)), which removed preexisting state power to 
require pre-sale registration disclosures by issuers, including the power to conduct presale disclosure review, merit 
review, or any kind of fairness review in most public and certain private offerings.  Warren III, supra note #,;   
Discussed infra notes #-# and accompanying text. 
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counterparts.67  The result is that the intended beneficiaries, namely small companies, never fully 
realize the benefits of federal exemptions from registration.68  
  Legitimate investor protection concerns should limit the extent to which regulators are 
able to provide relief from the requirements of federal or state securities law; however, in regards 
to small issuers, the costs associated with trying to enter the public capital markets are usually 
prohibitive.69  Small business transactions tend to raise less money than their large counterparts 
who can spread the costs of securities regulation compliance over “a broader base of income, 
assets, and shareholders resulting in a lower average cost of funds.”70  This places small 
companies at a distinct disadvantage when competing for public capital with their larger public 
counterparts.71  In most cases, the ability to perfect an exemption from registration determines 
whether or not the company will be able to acquire the necessary capital. 
The next section explores the history of the private offering exemption and will show that 
there is nothing in the Securities Act or legislative history to suggest Congress intended to 
prohibit general solicitation in the private offering context, let alone support the outcome 
determinative effect it has been given under Regulation D.  
 
 
 
                                                 
67 See STEINBERG, supra note 24, at 157.  Steinberg finds state attitude in favor of strong investor protection 
intriguing considering the “race to the bottom” approach taken by these same states under corporation laws.  See 
e.g., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).   
68 See e.g., Campbell, An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 553, 519 (1985) 
(asserting that “millions of dollars are spent each year on a system of [state] regulation that provides no significant 
protection to investors and retards capital formation.”); but see, Tyler, More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 899 (1982). 
69 Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: The Elusive Promise of “Technological Disintermediation” 
For Unregistered Offerings of Securities, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 2 (1998) (stating that historically the 
bulk of investment frauds have always been “heavily concentrated among new and unfamiliar ventures”). 
70 Daugherty, supra note 30, at 71 (arguing that small businesses are “undeniably handicapped in the 
competitive search for public capital”).  
71 Daugherty, supra note 30, at 71; see also, Cohn supra note 23, at 7. 
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II. THE PRIVATE OFFERING EXEMPTION: NO SHIRT, NO SHOES & 
ABSOLUTELY NO SOLICITATION 
 
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act exempts from the registration requirements 
“transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.”72  The definition of “issuer” under 
the Act is clear-cut,73 however, figuring out exactly what constitutes a “public offering” is a 
much more daunting task.74 Unfortunately, the term is not defined in the statute, and the 
conclusion of any inquiry into its breadth is highly fact dependent. 75   
Although there is nothing in the legislative history that would indicate Congressional 
intent to prohibit general solicitation or advertising in an offering exempted under section 4(2),76 
the anti-solicitation doctrine has evolved into what can only be described as a fundamental 
element of the current regulatory scheme.77   
The Supreme Court, interpreting section 4(2) in light of its stated purpose,78 in the 
seminal decision of S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina,79 reasoned:  
[s]ince the exempt transactions are those as to which ‘there is no practical need 
for [the bills] application’, the application of 4[2] should turn on whether the 
                                                 
72 15 U.S.C. § 7d(2) (2000). 
73 An “issuer” is the “person who issues or proposes to issue” a security.  Section 2(a)(4).  This definition, while 
not particularly helpful, doesn’t present any interpretive problems because it is understood that the term “issuer” 
means the entity that originally sells the security.  See LARRY D. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES 
LAWS § 6.2, at 6-4. 
 
75 See, e.g., Letter of General Counsel Discussing the Factors to be Considered in Determining the Availability 
of the Exemption from Registration Provided by the Second Clause of Section 4(1), Securities Act Release No. 33-
6389, 17 C.F.R. 231.285 (1935) [hereinafter 1935 Opinion] (stating “the determination of what constitutes a public 
offering is essentially a question of fact, in which all surrounding circumstances are of moment.”)  The 1935 opinion 
included the following six factors the SEC considered “important” in its “surrounding circumstances” review: (1) 
the number of offerees; (2) their relationship to each other; (3) their relationship to the issuer; (4) the number of 
units offered; (5) the size of the offering; and (6) the manner of the offering.  See 1935 Opinion, supra note 75.  
76  See  Daugherty, supra note 30, at 72 (stating “[i]ndeed, there is nothing at all in the Act or in its legislative 
history that might indicate what a “general solicitation” is”). See also, Cohn, supra note 23, at 9. (stating “[g]iven 
the scant legislative history  . . . it would be unreasonable to argue that the legislation has created a firmly defined 
public private distinction.”); 
77 Id. at 68. 
78 The legislative history expressly states that the purpose of section 4(2) is to exempt those transactions from 
registration “where there is no practical need for [such] application . . . [or] where the public benefits are too 
remote.”  H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933). 
79 346 U.S. 119 (1953). 
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particular class of persons needs the protection of the Act.  An offering to those 
who are shown to be able to fend for themselves in a transaction is a transaction 
‘not involving any public offering.’80   
 
The Court considered that transactions in which the offerees have knowledge of or access 
to the same kind of information that the act would make available in the form of a registration 
statement, are the kinds of transactions that fall within the private offering exemption.81 
In Ralston Purina, the Court determined that the sale of unregistered securities to   
employees the corporation termed “key employees” constituted a public offering and sale of 
unregistered securities in violation of section 5.82 The court held that since the employees were 
“not shown to have access to the kind of information which registration would disclose” and 
there “existed obvious opportunities for pressure and imposition,” section 4(2) did not exempt 
the sale.83  However, the Court made clear that not every offer or sale of securities to employees 
would constitute a public offering, stating “some employee offerings may come within section 
4(2), e.g., one made to executive personnel who because of their position have access to the same 
kind of information that the Act would make available in the form of a registration statement.”84 
                                                 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Ralston Purina sold nearly $2,000,000 in unregistered stock to its employees.  Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at #.  
The corporation, passed a resolution authorizing the sale of common stock “to employees . . . who shall, without any 
solicitation by the Company or its officers or employees, inquire or any of them as to how to purchase common 
stock of Ralston Purina Company.” Id. A memorandum was sent to branch and store managers advising that “[t]he 
only employees’ to whom this stock will be available will be those who take the initiative and are interested in 
buying stock at present market prices.”  Id. The employees responding to these offers were employees with the 
duties of artist, bakeshop foreman, clerical assistant, and others similarly situated.  Id.  
83 Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 120.   However, the Court made clear that not every offer or sale of securities to 
employees would constitute a public offering, stating “some employee offerings may come within the §4(2), e.g., 
one made to executive personnel who because of their position have access to the same kind of information that the 
Act would make available in the form of a registration statement.” 
84 Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 120.  Whether the offeree has access to the kind of information which registration 
would disclose was one of the factors stressed in an advisory opinion rendered by the Commission’s General 
Counsel in 1935.   
I [] regard as significant the relationship between the issuer and offerees.  Thus, an offering to the 
members of a class who should have special knowledge of the issuer is less likely to be a public 
offering that is an offering to the members of a class of the same size who do not have this 
advantage.  This factor would be particularly important in offerings to employees, where a class of 
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The Ralston Purina Court’s holding was simply “a refinement of the principle . . . that 
the seller in a private offering must at least have a rational basis for choosing particular 
offeree’s.”85  The Court focused on the nature of the offeree’s.  Under Ralston Purina, a 
particular offering should fall within the section 4(2) exemption so long as the seller extends 
offers only to those investors he reasonably believes are capable of fending for themselves.  The 
Court certainly did not impose any restrictions on the methods used to choose a particular class 
of offerees capable of fending for themselves.   “If Ralston Purina suggested a general 
solicitation prohibition at all, it suggested only that the seller cannot solicit among a group of 
offerees determined randomly or arbitrarily.”86 
The aftermath of Ralston Purina resulted in a more restrictive application of the section 
4(2) exemption than the Supreme Court would mandate.87  The principles that have emerged in 
                                                                                                                                                             
high executive officers would have a special relationship to the offeror which subordinate 
employees would not enjoy. 
11 Fed. Reg. 10952. 
In Ralston Purina, the Commission wanted the court to go even further and argued that an offer to a 
substantial number of the public is by definition not a private offering; however, the Court refused, as a matter of 
statutory interpretation, to “superimpose a quantity limit on private offerings.”  Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 120.   
85 Daugherty, supra note 30, at 74.  
The interpretation pointed out that the basis on which the offerees are selected is of greatest 
importance and indicated that where the offerees are chose from the general public at random, the 
offering may be found to be a public offering even though only a small number of offerees is 
involved. 
86 Daugherty, supra note 30, at 87. 
87 See Transactions by An Issuer Not Deemed to Involve any Public Offering, Securities Act Release No. 33-
53336 (November 8, 1972).  The SEC provided the following indication of its position on the interpretation of the 
factors traditionally considered in determining whether a particular offering was a transaction not involving a public 
offering:  
 ‘sophistication’ is not a substitute for access to the same type of information that registration 
would provide, and . . . a person's financial resources or sophistication are not, without more, 
sufficient to establish the availability of the exemption. On the other hand, . . . an offeree need not 
be an insider such as an officer or director of the issuer in order to have access to information . . . 
access can only exist by reason of the offeree's position with respect to the issuer. Position means 
an employment or family relationship or economic bargaining power that enables an offeree to 
obtain information from the issuer in order to evaluate the merits and risks of the investment as 
distinguished from situations where such position does not exist and the issuer voluntarily offers 
to provide or provides such information.  Moreover, . . . the mere disclosure of the [] kind of 
information that would be contained in a registration statement is not sufficient in itself to 
establish the availability of an exemption under Section 4(2) of the Act. 
Securities Act Release No. 33-53336, supra. 
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an attempt to stake out the boundaries of section 4(2), by both courts and Commission, provide 
little if any certainty for issuers attempting to structure an offering that falls under the purview of 
section 4(2).88 One thing, however, is certain, the decades of administratively, and to a lesser 
extent judicially, imposed requirements have, removed any utility section 4(2) may have had as a 
stand-alone exemption.89   
A. Rule 146 : “Serious Investor Protection, All Day and All Night” 
 
In an effort to clarify the private offering exemption under section 4(2), the SEC 
promulgated Rule 146.  The Rule 146 “safe harbor,” was enacted in response to growing 
concerns that the ambiguity of section 4(2) did not provide issuers adequate standards upon 
which they could rely in structuring an offering. 90  When the Rule was adopted, the Commission 
indicated its belief that that the Rule should provide “objective standards [upon which] 
responsible businessmen could rely,” and “deter reliance on the private offering exemption for 
securities offerings to persons unable to fend for themselves in terms of obtaining information 
about the issuer and of assuming the risk of the investment.”91   
In adopting Rule 146, the SEC looked to legislative history, statutory language, and 
judicial decisions interpreting section 4(2), stating that “the significant concepts in determining 
when a transaction is deemed not to involve any public offering are access to information that 
registration would disclose and the ability of offerees to be able to fend for themselves so as not 
                                                 
88 See, e.g., Sjostrum supra note 16, at 37.  Sjostrum notes that one attorney has characterized section 4(2) 
jurisprudence arising after Ralston has been described as a kind of mishmash, “[t]he issuer is now told that all of 
these factors have something to do with whether he has an exemption under section 4(2), but he is never given a hint  
as to the proper portions of the brew.”  Id. (citing Ray Garrett, Jr., The Private Offering Exemption Today, in Fourth 
Annual Institute on SEC Regulation 3, 10-11 (Robert H. Mundheim et al. eds., 1973).     
89 See McDermott, The Private Offering Exemption, 59 IOWA L. REV. 525, 549 (1974); Directorate of Exon. & 
Pol’y Analysis, SEC, An Analysis of Regulation D 14 (1984) (“40 years of case law has left issuers without any 
certainty that their offerings complied with Section 4(2)”). 
90 See The Private Placement Exemptive Rule, Securities Act Rule Release No. 5913, 1978 WL 197118. 
91 Id.  Many commentators expressed concern that the rule would swallow the broader section 4(2) exemption.  
In response the SEC included a preliminary note to the rule explicitly stating that the rule was “non-exclusive,” 
thereby preserving the statutory exemption of 4(2).  Id. 
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to need the protections afforded by registration.” 92  The SEC felt that limitations on the manner 
of offering,93 particularly a prohibition on general advertising in connection with any offering 
pursuant to the exemption, were essential to ensure “that persons to whom such securities are 
offered have the necessary access to information concerning the issuer and can fend for 
themselves.”94   
Rule 146 contained a quasi-exception from the prohibition on general solicitation and 
advertising for communications to “qualified offerees,” 95 that would have otherwise been 
                                                 
92 Transactions by An Issuer Not Deemed to Involve any Public Offering, Securities Act Release No. 33-53336 
(November 8, 1972).    
93 The manner of offering restrictions have always been of concern to the SEC, in the 1935 Opinion the SEC 
expressed concerns regarding what it called “preliminary” conversations, stating:  
I have very serious doubt whether, in many of those cases where it is stated that an offering is to 
be made only to an insubstantial number of persons, there may not be preliminary conversations 
for the purpose of ascertaining which of the various possible purchasers would be willing to accept 
an offer of the security in question if it were made to them.  Any such preliminary negotiations or 
conversations with a substantial number of prospective purchasers would, in my opinion, cause the 
offering in question to be a public offering, thereby necessitating prior registration of the securities 
in question. 
These concerns were codified in Rule 146(c),   
Limitation on Manner of Offering: Neither the issuer nor any person acting on its behalf shall 
offer, offer to sell, offer for sale, or sell the securities by means of any form of general solicitation 
or general advertising, including but not limited to, the following: 
(1) Any advertisement, article, notice or other communication published in any newspaper, magazine or 
similar medium or broadcast over television or radio; 
(2) Any seminar or meeting, except that if subparagraph (d)(1) is satisfied as to each person invited to or 
attending such seminar or meeting, and as to persons qualifying only under subdivision (d)(1)(ii), such 
persons are accompanied by their offeree representative(s), then such seminar or meeting shall be 
deemed not to be a form of general solicitation or advertising; and 
(3) Any letter, circular, notice or other written communication, except that if subparagraph (d)(1) is 
satisfied as to each person to whom the communication is directed and the communication contains an 
undertaking to provide the information specified by subparagraph (e)(1) on request, such communication 
shall be deemed not to be a form of general solicitation or general advertising. 
94 See Securities Act Release No. 33-5336.  As proposed, rule 146 required that offerings under the rule could 
only be made through a negotiated transaction, which it defined as one where the terms and arrangements relating to 
the sale of the securities would be arrived at through direct communication between the issuer or any person acting 
on its behalf and the purchaser or his investment representative. See Securities Act Release No. 33-5336 (November 
28, 1972).  The negotiated transaction requirement was deleted when Rule 146 was revised, however, the revision 
included a “direct communication” concept requiring that an offeree or offeree representative be given the 
opportunity to ask questions of, and receive answers from, the issuer or any person acting on its behalf, concerning 
the transaction's terms. See Securities Act Release No. 33-5430 (October 10, 1973).  As adopted, rule 146, did not 
retain the term “direct communication,” but retained the substantive requirement that the offeree or his 
representative be given the opportunity to ask questions of, and receive answers from, the issuer or a person acting 
on its behalf. See Securities Act Release No. 33-5487 (April 23, 1974). 
95  Rule 146(d): Nature of Offerees. The issuer and any person acting on its behalf who offer, offer to sell, 
offer for sale or sell the securities shall have reasonable grounds to believe and shall believe: 
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considered improper.96  The exemption operated as a “‘safe harbor’ within a ‘safe harbor’ and 
minimized close questions on the application of the condition prohibiting general solicitation.”97  
Availability of the “qualified offeree” safe harbor depended upon the issuer’s reasonable belief 
that that the offeree could bear the economic risk involved with the investment or had sufficient 
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters, alone or with the help of a 
purchaser representative, to evaluate the risks and benefits of the proposed investment.  
However, other than in a limited context98, the SEC did not provide any significant 
interpretations of the manner of offering limitations. 99  Some have suggested that the lack of 
interpretive releases is due to the wiggle room provided by the qualified offeree exception to the 
general solicitation prohibition.100 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) immediately prior to making any offer, either: 
(i) that the offeree has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is 
capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment, or 
(ii) that the offeree is a person who is able to bear the economic risk of the  
investment; and 
(2) immediately prior to making any sale, after making reasonable inquiry, either: 
(i) that the offeree has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is 
capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment, or 
(ii) that the offeree and his offeree representative(s) together have such knowledge and experience in 
financial and business matters that they are capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the 
prospective investment and that the offeree is able to bear the economic risk of the investment. 
96 Rule 146 (c)(3) provided that  
[a]ny letter, circular, notice or other written communication, except that if subparagraph (d)(1) is 
satisfied as to each person to whom the communication is directed and the communication 
contains an undertaking to provide the information specified by subparagraph (e)(1) on request, 
such communication shall be deemed not to be a form of general solicitation or general 
advertising. 
17 C.F.R.  § 230.146(c)(2)-(3). 
97 See David B. H. Martin, Jr. & L. Keith Parsons, The Preexisting Relationship Doctrine Under Regulation D:  
A Rule Without Reason?, 45 WASH. & LEE REV. 1031, 1035 (1988).  
98 See e.g.,  A. A. Ajax Co., Sec No. Action Letter, (Jan. 15, 1979); Trust Mortgage and Loan Svc., SEC No. 
Act Letter, (Dec. 27, 1979); Econative Corp., SEC No Action Letter, (Feb. 27, 1978). 
99 In addition to manner of offering restrictions, the rule required that any written materials include a statement 
indicating that access to or furnishing of the information in Rule 146(e)(1) would be made available upon request. 
Rule 146(e)(1) was the codification of the preexisting rule that offerees have access to the same kind of information 
that was required by Schedule A of the Act to the extent that the issuer possessed or could acquire the information. 
A distinction was made between reporting and non-reporting companies. Additionally, the offeree or offeree's 
representative had to be given an opportunity to verify the accuracy of this information. See Release No. 33- 5487 
(April 23, 1974). 
100 See Martin, supra note 97 at 1035. 
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Although Rule 146 provided issuers some ability to solicit potential investors, the rules 
focus on offerees posed numerous problems for small issuers.  In order to make a determination 
as to the offeree’s sophistication the issuer would surely have to provide some information about 
the offering.  The SEC’s position on preliminary conversations legitimizes these concerns.  The 
SEC had stated any “preliminary negotiations or conversations with a substantial number of 
prospective purchasers would . . . cause the offering in question to be a public offering, thereby 
necessitating prior registration of the securities in question.”101  In addition, Rule 146 did not 
address the problem of state registration requirements, which, as previously stated, pose many of 
the same problems as federal registration requirements. 
B. Regulation D: “Subject to Offeree Approval” 
 
In 1980, the SEC, given the opportunity to fix the problems created by the anti-
solicitation doctrine, not only refrained from removing the prohibitions, but extended them to 
section 3(b) limited offerings as well.  The Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980102 
(the “Incentive Act”), amended section 3(b) of the Securities Act providing the SEC with the 
authority to exempt securities offerings up to 5 million dollars, expanded the definition of 
“accredited investor,”103 and provided for the development of a uniform federal-state exemption 
                                                 
101 See 1935 Opinion supra note 75. 
102 94 Stat. 2275, codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. 
103 Regulation D gives preferential treatment to accredited investors “based on a theory that the persons that fall 
within the . . . designated categories can fend for themselves, and thus do not need the 1933 Act’s protection for 
their investment decisions.”  Warren, supra note #, at #.   In addition to various institutional investors the category 
of “accredited investors” includes certain individual based on net worth, annual income, and relationship to issuer. 
Section 501(a) Accredited investor. Accredited investor shall mean any person who comes within any of the 
following categories, or who the issuer reasonably believes comes within any of the following categories, at the 
time of the sale of the securities to that person: 
. . . 
(4) Any director, executive officer, or general partner of the issuer of the securities being offered or sold, or 
any director, executive officer, or general partner of a general partner of that issuer; 
(5) Any natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person's spouse, at the time 
of his purchase exceeds $1,000,000; 
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from registration for small issuers.104  Pursuant to that authority the SEC promulgated Regulation 
D, which became effective April 15, 1982. 
Regulation D emerged in 1982 as the latest of several attempts to balance the SEC’s 
traditional concern for investor protection with a renewed interest in removing unnecessary 
restraints on capital formation, particularly by small business.105  Regulation D is a series of six 
rules including three transactional exemptions included in rules 504, 505, and 506.106  Rule 
506107 was adopted under section 4(2) and replaced rule 146, while 504108 and 505109 were 
adopted under section 3(b), and replaced 240 and 242 respectively.110   
                                                                                                                                                             
(6) Any natural person who had an individual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent 
years or joint income with that person's spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years and has a 
reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year; 
. . . 
(8) Any entity in which all of the equity owners are accredited investors. 
104 Martin, supra note 97.   
105 Mark L. Sargent, The New Regulation D: Deregulation, Federalism and the Dynamics of Regulatory 
Reform, 68 Wash. U. L.Q. 225, (1990)( stating “[t]he SEC of the 1980s obviously was willing to go much farther in 
this direction than the SEC of the 1970s, whose approach to the 1933 Act exemptions was always somewhat 
grudging, but the long-term trend was basically consistent.”).  Sargent, supra note 75, at#.  Sargent explains that the 
“perception of the SEC's attitude as ‘grudging’ is reflected in the intense criticism of rule 146” Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.146 (rescinded 1982)). He also notes that many though the rule created more problems than it solved. See, 
e.g., Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers Under the Securities Act of 1933: Practical Foreclosure from the Capital 
Market, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1139; Coles, Has Securities Law Regulation in the Private Capital Market Become a 
Deterrent to Capital Growth?: A Critical Review, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 395, 463 (1975); Note, SEC Rules 144 and 
146: Private Placements for the Few, 59 VA. L. REV. 886, 921-22 (1973); Note, Revising the Private Placement 
Exemption, 82 Yale L.J. 1512, 1519 (1973). “Another SEC experiment of the 1970s, rule 240, 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 
(rescinded 1982) was criticized for being of little practical use because only offerings of no more than $100,000 
could be exempted thereunder.” Id. (citing see  Securities Act Release No. 6339, 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,800. 
106 The Regulation represented an attempt to harmonize the inconsistencies that had developed among the 
various section 3(b) and 4(2) exemptions. The SEC's solution was to define separate exemptions with distinct 
statutory bases, while providing a common set of definitions and conditions.  Rules 501-503 set forth definitions, 
terms, and conditions that apply generally throughout the regulation. 
107 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
108 17 C.F.R. § 230.505. xemption for limited offers and sales of securities not exceeding $5,000,000. 
(a) Exemption. Offers and sales of securities that satisfy the conditions in paragraph (b) of this section by an 
issuer that is not an investment company shall be exempt from the provisions of section 5 of the Act under 
section 3(b) of the Act. 
(b) Conditions to be met-- 
(1) General conditions. To qualify for exemption under this section, offers and sales must satisfy the terms 
and conditions of §§ 230.501 and  230.502. 
(2) Specific conditions-- 
(i) Limitation on aggregate offering price. The aggregate offering price for an offering of securities under 
this § 230.505, as defined in § 203.501(c), shall not exceed $5,000,000, less the aggregate offering price for 
all securities sold within the twelve months before the start of and during the offering of securities under 
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Regulation D represented a regulatory shift in thinking, the SEC no longer focused on the 
qualities of “offerees;” under Regulation D, the availability of an exemption depended on the 
particular characteristics of “purchasers.”111  Thus, a single offer to a non-sophisticated investor 
would not result in the loss of the entire exemption, assuming of course that the investor did not 
purchase the security.112  It is difficult to understand, and the SEC does not provide any 
explanation, why, in light of the shift in exemptive significance from “offerees” to “purchasers,” 
the anti-solicitation doctrine was included under Regulation D.113   
As the following section will show, the anti-solicitation doctrine greatly diminishes he 
utility of the new exemptions y injecting the same ambiguity and uncertainty that plagued both 
rule 146 and section 4(2) into the Regulation D. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
this section in reliance on any exemption under section 3(b) of the Act or in violation of section 5(a) of the 
Act. 
109 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. Exemption for limited offers and sales without regard to dollar amount of offering. 
(a) Exemption. Offers and sales of securities by an issuer that satisfy the conditions in paragraph (b) of this section shall 
be deemed to be transactions not involving any public offering within the meaning of section 4(2) of the Act. 
(b) Conditions to be met-- 
(1) General conditions. To qualify for an exemption under this section, offers and sales must satisfy all the 
terms and conditions of §§ 230.501 and 230.502. 
(2) Specific Conditions-- 
(i) Limitation on number of purchasers. There are no more than or the issuer reasonably believes that there 
are no more than 35 purchasers of securities from the issuer in any offering under this section. 
(ii) Nature of purchasers. Each purchaser who is not an accredited investor either alone or with his purchaser 
representative(s) has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of 
evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment, or the issuer reasonably believes immediately 
prior to making any sale that such purchaser comes within this description. 
110 Proposed Revision of Certain Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 for 
Transactions involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6339 [hereinafter Reg. D Proposal] 
(Aug. 7, 1981).  Rule 504 was intended to “set aside a clear and workable exemption for small offerings by small 
issuers to be regulated by state ‘Blue Sky’ requirements and to be subject to federal antifraud provisions and civil 
liability provisions such as section 12(2).”  Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 The SEC simply stated its belief that “the limitation as to the manner of the offering . . . set forth in proposed 
502(c) and (d) are sufficient to assure that the offering is private in nature.”  Reg D Proposal, at *21.   
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III. RULE 502(C):  “EXPOSING GENERAL SOLICITORS”   
 
Rule 502(c), prohibits an issuer or any person acting on its behalf from offering or selling 
securities by means of any form of general solicitation, except in limited circumstances under 
rule 504.114  Rule 502(c) provides the following nonexhaustive list of prohibited solicitations: 
1. Any advertisement, article, notice, or other communication published in any newspaper, 
magazine, or similar media or broadcast over television or radio; and  
2. Any seminar or meeting whose attendees have been invited by any general solicitation or 
general advertising.115 
 
This is similar to the provision contained in previous Rule 146(c), except an additional 
prohibition concerning seminars or meetings was added to reflect the abandonment of the  
“qualified offeree” concept.116  The SEC eliminated the concept in response to commentators 
views that it is impossible to evaluate an offeree’s qualifications without providing the offeree 
basic information concerning the offering.  There was concern over the possibility that an 
inadvertent offer would result in the loss of the “safe harbor” protection.  The SEC adopted the 
commentators position stating, “eliminating the offeree qualifications would not result in a loss 
of protection to investors since any investor would still have to be qualified before purchasing 
the securities.”117 
Recent history suggests the SEC continues to equate a kind of nostalgic significance to 
the general solicitation prohibition.  It is possible that part of the reason the anti-solicitation 
doctrine remains a favored regulatory instrument, is due to the fact that the term “accredited 
investor,” as defined in regards to individuals, does not adequately differentiate between those 
investors who need the protection of the securities act and those who do not.  The following 
                                                 
114 Id. 
115 17 C,F.R. § 230.502 (2000). 
116 Reg. D Proposal, supra note 111. 
117 Id. at *21. 
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sections will show that relying on the general solicitation and advertising prohibitions, as applied 
under Regulation D, is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure investor protection.    
A. The Preexisting Relationship: “Maintaining the Sanctity of Private 
Offerings” 
 
The SEC added insult to injury when, for all intents and purposes, it reintroduced a 
stricter form of offeree qualification than that contained under previous section 146(c).118  
Through a number of No-action letters and interpretive releases, the SEC effectively restricted 
the Regulation D exemptions to transactions involving only those offerees with whom the issuer 
or anyone acting on his behalf has “a preexisting substantial relationship,”119 because any offer 
made to a potential investor with whom the issuer or his representative lack a preexisting 
substantial relationship could be deemed a general solicitation.  The SEC stated: 
[t]he types of relationships with offerees that may be important in establishing 
that a general solicitation has taken place are those that would enable the issuer 
(or a person acting on his behalf) to be aware of the financial circumstances or 
sophistication of the persons with whom the relationship exists or that otherwise 
are of some substance and duration.120 
 
What the SEC gave with its right hand, it took away with its left.  This slight of hand resulted in 
a more restrictive, “issuer unfriendly” regulatory climate than the previous exemptive scheme 
under Rule 146.  Although, a single offer to an unqualified investor would no longer result in the 
loss of an exemption under rule 506, the result is essentially the same.  If the issuer’s relationship 
with an offeree did not provide the issuer or person acting on his behalf with special knowledge 
                                                 
118 It has also been suggested that the preexisting relationship doctrine may have been an attempt to resurrect the 
holding in SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1938) which stated that the “public” “private” 
distinction determination depends upon a sort of “suitability requirement.” The court said that there should be some 
sort of suitable relationship between the basis for selecting an investor and the purposes for which the selection was 
made. However, this judicial standard that has long been discredited.  Martin, supra note X 
119  See generally Mineral Lands Research & Marketing Corp., SEC No-Act WL 55694 (Dec. 4, 1985); Robert 
T. Willis, SEC No-Act. WL 233597 (Jan 18, 1988); Royce Exchange Fund Quest Advisory Corp., SEC No-Act. WL 
490692 (Aug. 28, 1996); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., SEC No-Act. 55679 (Dec. 3, 1985).  For a thorough 
examination of the preexisting relationship doctrine see, Martin, supra note 97. 
120 In Mineral Lands Research & Marketing Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, (Dec. 3, 1985) 
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of the investors “financial circumstance or sophistication,” than any communication that could 
be considered an “attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or 
interest in a security, for value” could result in a finding that a general solicitation had 
occurred.121 
It is unclear what motivated the SEC to introduce the “preexisting relationship” doctrine 
only months after doing away with the concept of “qualified offeree.”122  Since its introduction in 
Mineral Lands Research & Marketing Corp, the preexisting relationship requirement has been 
the subject of numerous No-Action requests, however, the SEC’s response to these requests have 
done little if anything to clarify the area.123  
B. Explaining the Concerns: “Small Issuer Seeks Wealthy Individual for Discreet 
Transaction, Sophistication Preferred.”   
 
Investor protection concerns arise as a result of the over inclusive nature of the 
“accredited investor” exemption.  It can hardly be argued that the class of individual investors 
currently satisfying the wealth requirements under section 502(c) includes some members that 
lack any semblance of financial or business acumen sufficient to justify the conclusion that they 
are able to fend for themselves.  Under Ralston, access to the type of information a registration 
statement would provide was considered instrumental to a finding that the offeree could fend for 
himself; however, the individual wealth requirements under the “accredited investor” exemption 
do nothing to assure that the “unsophisticated wealthy investor,” even assuming access to the 
type of information a registration statement would provide, possesses the ability to capably 
determine the merits and risks associated with a particular investment.   As such, it is easy to see 
why the SEC considers the prohibition on general solicitation and advertising significant, 
                                                 
121 In Mineral Lands Research & Marketing Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, (Dec. 3, 1985). 
122 See Martin, supra note 97.  
123 Id. 
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particularly when interpreted as including a “preexisting relationship” requirement.  These two 
restrictions together certainly increase the probability that “offers” will be kept out of the hands 
of the wealthy yet unsophisticated investor. 
  The other side of the equation is that the general solicitation prohibition contributes to the 
“information gap.”  Studies have shown that this hinders the formation of an efficient market for 
the securities of small ventures, which contributes to the continued expansion of the “funding 
gap, thereby, increasing the likelihood that the capital needs of small ventures capable of 
producing significant returns, to both society and investors, remain unfilled.    
Although, shifting regulatory significance from the “offeree” to the “purchaser” was 
significant, any benefits that may have been realized were extremely short lived.  Maintaining 
the anti-solicitation doctrine in Regulation D does not provide any benefits significant enough to 
justify the resulting harms.  After all, it is the actual sale of the security that gives rise to the risk 
of loss, not the offer.  The next section suggests that the SEC’s continued reliance on the anti-
solicitation doctrine is the result of a false distinction drawn between private and public 
offerings. 
C. Not Private, Not Public: “What We’ve Got Here Is, A Failure to Differentiate” 
 
The SEC’s analysis regarding the appropriateness of removing “offeree qualification” 
from the new rule 506 private offering “safe harbor,” suggests the Commission draws a false 
distinction between the “private” nature of an offering and the “sophistication” concept that 
pervades section 4(2) jurisprudence.  The Commission reasons that the prohibition on general 
solicitation contained in 502(c) maintains the private nature of the offering, and that the 
information requirements and “accredited investor” concept assures investor protection.124  This 
suggests that the SEC reads an additional requirement of “privacy” into section 4(2) even though 
                                                 
124 See supra notes ##, and accompanying text.  
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there is nothing in Ralston or the legislative history to suggest that section 4(2) requires an 
independent restriction on the manner of the offering.  If the offering is designed to include only 
those persons capable of fending for themselves, then any additional requirements are 
superfluous.  
A private offering has historically been defined in the negative, i.e., a transaction not 
involving any public offering.  A transaction not involving any public offering is a transaction 
involving investors that do not require the protection afforded by the Securities Act, i.e., 
sophisticated investors, or investors who can fend for themselves.  If qualifying each and every 
purchaser assures that the transaction involves only investor’s capable of fending for themselves, 
then by definition a transaction that qualifies every purchaser is a “private offering.”125  The 
additional requirement that issuers refrain from engaging in actions that may be considered a 
general solicitation is overkill. 
As the next section indicates, the SEC has already, in limited circumstances, provided for 
general solicitation and advertising in connection with the offer or sale of unregistered securities.  
For 10 years, small companies in California have engaged in limited solicitation and advertising 
and there is no evidence to suggest that removing the prohibition on solicitation and advertising 
resulted in an increase of fraud or abuse. 
 
 
                                                 
125 Put in the form of a syllogism the argument looks like this 
I. All private offerings are transactions involving purchasers that do not need the protection of the 
Securities Act. 
II. All transactions that qualify purchasers are transactions involving purchasers that do not need the 
protection of the Securities Act. 
Δ All transactions that qualify purchasers are private offerings. 
The author, recognizing both the lack of insight such arguments rarely, if ever, provide into issues involving 
significant policy considerations and their inherently flawed nature, intended this syllogism to be taken as a tongue 
in cheek demonstration of the fuzzy logic surrounding the anti-solicitation doctrine.    
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D. Regulation CE [code name:] Concerted Effort   
 
In an apparent retreat from the continued expansion of the anti-solicitation doctrine the 
SEC enacted Regulation CE, which provided an exemption from registration for “[o]ffers and 
sales of securities that satisfy the conditions of paragraph (n) of Sec. 25102(n) of the California 
Corporations Code. . . .” 126  The SEC considered Regulation CE to be an extension of the “test 
the waters” concept of Regulation A to private offerings.127  Under Regulation A, the SEC 
allows small issuers who participate in a “mini-registration” to engage in a form of general 
solicitation, which permits small issuers to solicit interest from potential investors prior to 
actually engaging in a securities offering.128  There are few limits on means of solicitation or 
information that can be contained in the materials as long as certain disclaimers are used and the 
materials are filed with the SEC.129 
Regulation CE, via section 25102(n) of the California Corporations Code, exempts 
offerings to “qualified purchasers” and provides for limited solicitation and advertising even if 
                                                 
126See Exemption for Certain California Limited Issues, Securities Act Release No. 7285, at 88,008, [1995 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,803 (June 27, 1995), and adopted in May 1996, Small Business 
Registration Exemption, Securities Act Release No.7285, [1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) ¶  85,803 
(May 1, 1996.  It became effective on June 10, 1996. Exemption for Certain California Limited Issues, 61 Fed. Reg. 
21356 (1996).     
127 See Securities Act Release No. 7285 supra note 2, at  88,008  (“The California exemption combines a form 
of general solicitation using a “test the waters” concept with a qualified purchaser concept . . . .”).  The California 
exemption provides a “test the waters” type of exemption similar to Regulation A, with some additional limits on the 
type of statements that can be made in the preliminary solicitation and expands the class of potential investors that 
may be solicited.  See 25 Cal. Corp. Code § 25102(n). In addition, Regulation CE, as interpreted, expressly 
authorizes the use of internet-based solicitation for the purpose of “testing the waters.”  Commissioner’s Opinion 
96/2C, (Oct. 17, 1996) available in LEXIS, StSec Library, Cacase File. 
128 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.254 (2005) (allowing issuers to solicit interest from potential investors prior to filing an 
offering statement). 
129 See Michael Keller Enterprises, SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 76,952, at 78,751 (Dec. 1, 
1994) (stating expressly that there are no limitations, other than those imposed by the antifraud requirements, 
regarding the content of a test the waters solicitation).  Neither Regulation A nor Regulation CE adequately address 
the problems associated with the anti-soliciation doctrine.  Regulation CE is insufficient because of its geographic 
restrictions, furthermore, promoting individual states to enact similar exemptive provisions would only serve to 
ensure the development of fifty different regulatory schemes containing countless administratively and judicially 
imposed perquisites.  A full analysis of Regulation A and CE is beyond the scope of this paper, however, it is 
sufficient to note that Regulation A requires a “mini registration,” which includes many of the same costs as full 
registration.  In addition, Regulation A does not alleviate the costs associated with state registration, which as 
previously discussed, raises many of the same concerns as federal registration.   
 33
non-qualified purchasers receive the solicitation.130  The California exemption expands the class 
of potential investors that may be solicited.131  In addition, the California exemption, as 
interpreted, expressly authorizes the use of internet-based solicitation for the purpose of “testing 
the waters.”132  This exemption was designed to increase the ability of start-up companies to 
acquire necessary capital, without sacrificing investor protection and was part of the SEC’s 
“continuing effort to ease the regulatory burdens on small businesses issuing securities.”133 The 
SEC recognized “the inability to reach out broadly to find potentially qualified investors for . . . 
exempt offerings hampers the utility of the exemption and may raise the costs to companies 
trying to do these exempt offerings.”134  The SEC also indicated that it would be willing to grant 
exemptions to any other state that adopted an exemption modeled after the California 
exemption;135 however, no other state has requested a similar exemption.136   
                                                 
130 See Cal. Corp. Code § 25102(n) (Deering 1997). 
131 Id. 
132 Commissioner’s Opinion 96/2C, (Oct. 17, 1996) available in LEXIS, StSec Library, Cacase File. 
133 C. Stephen Bradford, The SEC’s New Regulation CE Exemption: Federal-State Coordination Run Rampant, 
52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 429, 430 (1998) Bradford argues that “the basic idea underlying Regulation CE – allowing 
issuers to solicit qualified purchasers – is sensible,” but effectively provides “California authorities the power to 
determine the scope of an exemption from federal securities laws,” which likely, exceeds the SEC’s regulatory 
authority, violates of the Administrative Procedures Act, and violates the preemption provisions of section 18 of the 
Securities Act when applied to “covered securities.” Id.  
134 Id. 
135 See Securities Act Release No. 7285, Fed Sec. L. Rep (CCH) ¶ 85, 803, at 88,009 (1996).  No other state has 
requested a similar exemption.  In 1997, the North American Association of Securities Administrators (NAASA) 
enacted the Model Accredited Investor Exemption (MAIE), which was an attempt at a uniform system of exemption 
from state securities regulations for offerings to accredited investors, however, the SEC refrained from adopting the 
exemption with regard to section 505 and 506.  See STEINBERG, supra note 24.  
The MAIE was modeled largely after Regulation CE, however, there was not a state nexus requirement, some 
have suggested the lack of a nexus requirement was the primary factor the SEC refused to adopt the MAIE with 
regard to section 505 or 506.  See STEINBERG, supra note 24.  The MAIE provided restricted sales to persons who 
are or the issuer reasonably believes are accredited investors, as defined in 17 CFR 230.501(a).  Pursuant to the 
MAIE the issuer could distribute a general announcement of the proposed offering by any means but the information 
that could be included in the general announcement was limited to the following: issuer’s name, address and 
telephone number; name, a brief description and price (if known) of any security to be issued; a brief description of 
the issuer’s business in 25 words or less; the type, number and aggregate amount of securities being offered; the 
name, address and telephone number of the person to contact for additional information; and a statement that: (1) 
sales will only be made to accredited investors; (2) no money or other consideration is being solicited or will be 
accepted by way of the general announcement; and the securities have not been registered with or approved by any 
state securities agency or the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and are being offered and sold pursuant to 
an exemption from registration.  The MAIE provided that additional information could be provided if delivered 
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In the same proposal and request for comments the SEC considered amending Regulation 
D to eliminate the ban on general solicitation in rule 505 and 506 offerings.137  There were a 
significant number of comments supporting the proposal, however, the SEC deferred action on 
eliminating general solicitation indicating that the comments would be considered in future 
initiatives.138 
IV. WHAT NOW? 
 
A. The Time For Reform is Upon Us. 
 
The preemptive authority granted to the SEC under The National Securities Market 
Improvement Act of 1996139 (“NSMIA”) provides the perfect opportunity to finally rid the world 
of the anti-solicitation doctrine.140  The NSMIA was designed to modernize the securities laws, 
promote investment, decrease the cost of capital, and encourage competition.  The legislative 
history makes it clear that Congress intended to preempt state regulation in offers and sales to 
financially sophisticated investors and gave the SEC the authority to determine the sophistication 
requirements for the purpose of providing a nationwide, uniform definition, thereby eliminating 
the variations found among the states.141   
                                                                                                                                                             
through an electronic database that is restricted to persons who have been pre-qualified as accredited investors; or is 
delivered after the issuer reasonably believes that the prospective purchaser is an accredited investor.  In addition the 
MAIE permitted telephone solicitation if the issuer prior to placing the call reasonably believes that the prospective 
purchaser to be solicited is an accredited investor.  The exemption, also provided that disseminating the general 
announcement non accredited investors would not disqualify the issuer from claiming the exemption. at 
www.nasaa.org/content/getsearchablefile. cfm?FamilyID=863& 
filename=Model_Accredited_Investor_Exemption.pdf 
136 See STEINBERG, supra note 24, at 118.  [insert MAIE] 
137 See Securities Act Release No. 33-7185 (June 27, 1995). 
138 See Securities Act Release No. 33-7285 (May 1, 1996). 
139 Pub. L. No. 104-290, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). 
140 See Advisory Report, supra note 26, at *41. 
141 H.R. Rep. No. 622, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. at 31 (1996) [“House Report NSMIA”] (stating “[f]irst, many states 
currently exempt such securities from registration requirements, but the qualification standard can vary from State to 
State.  This provision will result in a uniform national rule for qualified purchasers, which should greatly facilitate 
the ability of issuers to use it.”) 
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Section 308 of the NSMIA amended Section 18 of the Securities Act, preempting three 
categories of securities from state securities regulation.142  The legislation “withdrew the 
preexisting power of the states to require pre-sale registration disclosures by issuers, including 
the power to conduct presale disclosure review, merit review, or any kind of fairness review in 
connection with most public and private offerings of securities conducted within the states’ 
respective jurisdictions.”143 
For the first time Congress granted the SEC general exemptive authority under the 
Securities Act.144  Under NSMIA the SEC must determine that the use of their exemptive 
authority is “necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of 
investors”145  Congress granted this authority with the understanding that it would be used to 
adopt new approaches to registration and disclosure that furthered the underlying goal of 
promoting efficiency, competition, and capital formation. 146   
Unfortunately, SEC response to the Congressional intent fell far short of reaching any of 
the NSMIA’s express goals.147 In December 2001, the SEC sought comments on a proposed rule 
that would define  “qualified purchasers” to mean “accredited investor” as defined in Rule 501(a) 
of Regulation D.  The Commission examined the preemptive effects of defining “qualified 
purchaser” to mean “accredited investor,” stating: 
We believe that the proposed qualified purchaser definition would reduce costs 
for issuers by expanding the number of investors to whom issuers may offer and 
sell securities without complying with state registration requirements. 
. . . 
                                                 
142 Pub. L. No. 104-290, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). 
143 Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case for Reallocation of 
Regulatory Responsibilities, 78 WASH U. L.Q. 497, 498 (2000). 
144 See SEC Release No. 34-40632A (Nov. 17, 1998) 
145 15 U.S.C. s 77z-3 (2000) 
146 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-622, 104 Cong. 2d. Sess. (1996). 
147 Campbell, supra note #, at 175 (expressing harsh criticism of the NSMIA and subsequent Commission 
response, noting the irony that the one segment of the economy in need of most relief, received the least amount of 
help.) 
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There may also be a cost to investors through the loss of benefits of state 
registration and oversight . . . [however] we do not think this cost will be 
significant . . . [because accredited investors] do not benefit from state regulation 
in a way that justifies the costs to the issuers subject to state registration 
requirements.148 
 
 The position taken by the commission is a departure from the notion that allowing 
general solicitation and advertising in connection with the offer or sale of exempt securities is 
inconsistent with investor protection.  Any state exemption from registration for offerings to 
accredited investors under Rule 504 would be rendered ineffective.  The Commission’s proposal 
would have resulted in a categorical exemption from registration for offerings to accredited 
investors in up to 1,000,000 in any 12 month period.  Unfortunately, the Commission’s proposed 
definition never resulted in a final rule.  
 The SEC’s failure to address the needs of small businesses despite Congress’ express call 
to action under the NSMIA is evidence of either administrative reluctance or inability.  The SEC 
clearly has the authority to promulgate uniform exemptions from state registration permitting the 
use of a general solicitation or advertising in either (1) offerings to accredited investors under 
section 4(2), or (2) offerings made to “qualified purchasers.”   
The SEC’s exemptive authority extends to situations where an exemption from the 
requirements of the securities laws is “necessary or appropriate in the public interest and 
consistent with the protection of investors.”149  The SEC’s statement in the 2001 Release that 
“accredited investors do not benefit from state regulation in a way that justifies the costs to the 
issuers subject to state registration requirements,”150 supports a the proposition that an exemption 
for SPI’s permitting general solicitation and advertising is appropriate in the public and 
                                                 
148 See Defining the Term Qualified Purchaser Under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act Release No. 
8041, 2001 WL 34681692, at *11 (December 19, 2001). 
149 15 U.S.C. s 77z-3 (2000) 
150 See Defining the Term Qualified Purchaser Under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act Release No. 
8041, 2001 WL 34681692, at *11 (December 19, 2001). 
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consistent with investor protection.  Congress’ express intent to promote efficiency, competition, 
and capital formation further supports this conclusion. 151  As the previous sections have shown, 
the registration requirements, as applied to small companies are disproportionately burdensome 
and excessively prohibitive.  Given the important role SPI’s play in the nation’s economy, such 
an exemption for SPI’s that would permit general solicitation and advertising is both necessary 
for capital formation and appropriate for investor protection. 
B. A Sophisticated Proposal  
 
The SEC should adopt a Regulation providing SPI’s a “safe harbor” under section 4(2) 
that would permit general solicitation and advertising.  The exemption should be available for 
offerings involving sales to persons satisfying the definition of accredited investor or persons the 
issuer reasonably believes satisfy the definition of accredited investor.  The only restriction on 
the manner of offering should be that any written materials include a legend indicating that the 
offering is limited to persons satisfying the definition of “accredited investor” as defined in 
section 501(a) and that the securities are not registered with the SEC and are being offered 
pursuant to an exemption from registration.  The exemption should contain resale restrictions 
similar to those in Rule 506 and should focus only on purchasers, thereby avoiding the problems 
associated with Rule 146.  Since the exemption would only be available in transactions where all 
purchasers met the definition of accredited investor there should be no formal information 
requirements or limits on the content of communications, subject of course to federal antifraud 
and civil liability provisions.  These changes would provide small issuers with the flexibility to 
craft an offering based on the pool of potential investors and effectively preempt the states from 
imposing registration requirements on private offerings.   
                                                 
151 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-622, 104 Cong. 2d. Sess. (1996). 
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This article suggests that two alternative approaches are available to assuage the SEC’s 
investor protector concerns.  First, the wealth requirements with respect to individuals under § 
501(a)(6) and (a)(7), could be increased.  Second, the exemption could leave the definition of 
accredited investors as it currently stands but apply the purchaser requirements of section 
506(b)(2)(ii) to individual accredited investors satisfying either 501(a)(6) or (a)(7).  This would 
require that the issuer make a separate determination as to whether the purchaser, alone or with 
the assistance of others, immediately prior to the sale possesses the requisite business and 
financial acumen to adequately assess the merits and risks of the investment.152 
It could be argued that the current accredited investor standards no longer adequately 
distinguish between those who need and those who do not need the protections afforded by the 
Securities Act.  To justify the absence of any formal informational requirements the standard for 
individual accreditation should be premised on investor sophistication.153  Although access is 
                                                 
152 Section 506(b)(2)(ii) requires “[e]ach purchaser who is not an accredited investor either alone or with his 
purchaser representative(s) has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable 
of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment, or the issuer reasonably believes immediately prior 
to making any sale that such purchaser comes within this description.  17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2000).  In 
addition, the exemption should permit the use of purchaser representatives as defined in section 501(h).  Section  
501(h) states: 
Purchaser representative shall mean any person who satisfies all of the following conditions or 
who the issuer reasonably believes satisfies all of the following conditions: 
(1) Is not an affiliate, director, officer or other employee of the issuer, or beneficial owner of 10 
percent or more of any class of the equity securities or 10 percent or more of the equity interest in 
the issuer. . . . 
. . . 
(2) Has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of 
evaluating, alone, or together with other purchaser representatives of the purchaser, or together 
with the purchaser, the merits and risks of the prospective investment; 
(3) Is acknowledged by the purchaser in writing, during the course of the transaction, to be his 
purchaser representative in connection with evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective 
investment; and 
(4) Discloses to the purchaser in writing a reasonable time prior to the sale of securities to that 
purchaser any material relationship between himself or his affiliates and the issuer or its affiliates 
that then exists, that is mutually understood to be contemplated, or that has existed at any time 
during the previous two years, and any compensation received or to be received as a result of such 
relationship. 
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(h). 
153 The Subcommittee on Capital Formation to ….. 
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necessary for investor protection, because registration statements, offering memorandums, and 
other offering materials do not come in “For Dummies”154 versions, it is not sufficient.   
In the case of an unsophisticated wealthy investor, access alone will not assure that a 
capable assessment of the merits and risks associated with the investment will take place.  While 
sophistication does not always guarantee access, a sophisticated individual is more likely to 
recognize fraud or other abuses and is less likely to enter into transactions where they are 
incapable of bearing the associated risks.  Therefore, any requirement should place more 
significance on sophistication.   
Although, wealth is not a proxy for sophistication, a rational relationship between the two 
does exist.  An individual with greater income and assets is more likely to possess either the 
requisite business and financial acumen, or the ability to pay for the services of someone who 
does.  As such, raising the wealth requirements to a level consistent with the goal of maximizing 
the number of sophisticated members that compose the class of individual accredited investors 
would serve to increase investor protection.155   
It could be argued that the relationship between wealth and sophistication is insufficient 
to adequately address investor protection concerns.  As previously discussed, any standard 
should be designed to increase the probability that each and every purchaser is capable, either 
alone or with the assistance of others, of evaluating the risks and merits associated with the 
investment.  Applying section 506(b)(2)(ii) to accredited investors would greatly increase the 
likelihood that each and every purchaser possesses the requisite sophistication.  Applying this 
standard, however, would sacrifice objectivity at the hands of investor protection.   
                                                 
154 “For Dummies” is a popular series of “do it yourself” books published by Wiley Publishing, Inc. 909 3rd 
Avenue, New York, NY 10022, www.wiley.com.   
155 It has been suggested that …. 
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It is impossible to determine whether the benefits associated with requiring issuers to 
make a “sophistication” determination would outweigh any costs associated with making such a 
determination.156  One concern with requiring issuers to make purchaser qualification decision is 
that the SEC and the courts could eviscerate the exemption by imposing excessive standards of 
“reasonable belief.”  Administrative and judicial tinkering seems to increase in proportion to 
subjectivity.  Objective bright line standards, however, operate on the assumption that “one size 
fits all,” which, is rarely, if ever the case.  
Under either proposal, every purchaser must meet the definition of accredited investor, as 
the SEC itself has on occasion recognized, “since any investor would still have to be qualified 
before purchasing the securities,” there should be no loss of investor protection.  The proposed 
exemption would facilitate the free flow of information, which would promote the formation of 
an efficient market.  Raising the wealth standard might increase the number of sophisticated 
members that compose the class of accredited investors, however, requiring actual investor 
sophistication, or the existence of a reasonable belief of investor sophistication seems to be more 
consistent with current SEC positions.  In essence, the sophistication determination is a 
restatement of the “preexisting relationship” doctrine except applied to purchasers not offerees.  
This article argues that the better approach would be to leave the accredited investor 
definition as it is but apply the purchaser qualifications of section 506(b)(2)(ii) to accredited 
investors.  Requiring issuers to make a sophistication determination but permitting general 
solicitation and advertising would promote the free flow of information, facilitate the formation 
of an efficient market, and provide adequate investor protection. 
                                                 
156 One concern with requiring issuers to make purchaser qualification determinations is that the SEC and the 
courts could eviscerate the exemption by imposing restrictions similar to the preexisting relationship doctrine.  
Administrative and judicial tinkering seems to increase in proportion to subjectivity.  Objective bright line standards, 
however, operate on the assumption that “one size fits all,” which, is rarely if ever the case.   
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C. Reality Check 
 
The investor protection concerns associated with permitting general solicitation and 
advertising are unfounded.  Just about every state recognizes “that if you advertise on the 
Internet but disclaim that you are not selling securities to their residents, and, in fact, do not sell 
to their residents, you have not made an illegal offering in that state.” 157 In addition, this is the 
same approach taken by the SEC in regards to foreign companies.158  Why should a different 
standard be applied against U.S. issuers as “long as (1) it includes a warning that it will not sell 
to investors who do not meet the definition of accredited investor and (2) does not, in fact, sell to 
unsophisticated investors? Who is harmed?” 159   
Conclusion 
 
The proposed exemption serves to promote the efficiency of PSI’s as mechanisms 
through which competition and innovation can serve as catalysts in the process of “Creative 
Destruction,” and at the same time ensures adequate levels of investor protection.  The increasing 
economic significance of innovative entrepreneurial ventures, Congressional intent, and current 
practice all support the conclusion that the proposed exemption is both necessary for capital 
formation and adequate for investor protection.  By increasing access to relevant reliable 
information the proposed exemption will facilitate PSI capital formation, increase job and new 
wealth creation, and ultimately promote the formation of an efficient market, thereby, creating an 
environment where “ prevailing prices of [PSI] securities [more adequately] reflect[] the value 
that an informed investor would rationally be willing to pay.”160    
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